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Introduction
DRC is often taken as a textbook case of state failure. Academics and practitioners alike see 
dim prospects for the establishment of a well-functioning and legitimate state bureaucracy 
in the near future. The pressing question is, how, under the current conditions, legitimate 
and effective local state authority may evolve and what type of state building strategies might 
be effective. This research proposes land governance could be one, potentially powerful, 
avenue for the transformation or re-establishment of public authority and of state building at 
the local level. The current concerns around land conflict and land tenure insecurity in DRC 
afford – at least in theory – an opening for state authorities to claim a presence at the local 
level as provider of land related services and to regain legitimacy as the upholder of order 
and security. 
This project explored how current land governance programmes in DRC feed into this 
potential for state building. In this, we follow the theoretical propositions of Unruh (2003), 
who suggests that land governance in post-conflict settings can contribute to a gradual 
process of state building; and Sikor and Lund (2009), who argue that land governance 
and state authority in Africa are closely linked and co-evolve. This theoretical starting point 
resonated with observations of key stakeholders in the Kivus, notably of our partner in the 
research project, UN-Habitat, who noticed potential connections between land governance 
reform and state building objectives, and expressed a concern that the ongoing stabilization 
programme in eastern DRC while dedicated to land dispute and reconciliation issues, fails to 
connect to institution-building. 
Currently, the debate on land policy and land governance in DRC seems to gain momentum, 
and there is increasing political will to interlink interventions in the land sector. This is 
exemplified by the creation of a Land Reform Steering Committee, and the adoption by the 
Congolese government of a road map for land reform deriving from a nationwide stakeholder 
workshop in July 2012. With this exploratory research we hope to feed into these ongoing 
debates.
This research report is based on two weeks of interviews with representatives of international 
and Congolese development organizations, and some representatives from local government 
and academic institutions in North and South Kivu.
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 The aim of the interviews was to map 
intended and perceived effects of interventions on public authority and the establishment 
of state authority in particular. The main question guiding the interviews was: How can 
1 Interviews took place in the period of 18-29 November 2013 in Goma, Bukavu and Masisi. On 29 November, we organized a restitution work-
shop in Goma, to which about 30 representatives of intervening organizations participated.
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interventions in the field of land governance contribute to the legitimacy and capacity of 
public institutions and to a strengthening of the state at the local level? 
The research was exploratory and restricted in time and scope. In total, we interviewed 36 
people, representing 24 organizations with substantial programmes in the field of land 
governance in North and South Kivu. We do not claim to have made a complete inventory 
of land-related interventions. Rather we aim to outline the diversity of interventions, the 
assumptions guiding them, and their observed or expected impacts on institution building. 
This report summarises what interviewees observed on their own interventions and those of 
other organizations and reflects on the implications for institutional change and the role of 
the state. With this we hope to further the debate and suggest an agenda for more extensive 
research on these issues. 
The research project was a collaboration between UN-Habitat, African Studies Centre at 
Leiden University, Centre for International Conflict Analysis and Management at Radboud 
University Nijmegen, and the Sociology of Development and Change Group at Wageningen 
University. It was co-financed by the IS Academy Human Security in Fragile States, which 
is hosted by the Special Chair on Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction at Wageningen 
University, and which is concerned with questions of post-conflict recovery. 
Outline of the report
In section 2 we explain the theoretical debates underpinning the central proposition of our 
research, i.e. that land governance may be an avenue of post-conflict state building. This is 
followed by section 3 which outlines the main rationales and strategies of land governance 
interventions in the Kivus and the governance challenges they identify. Section 4 analyses 
how these efforts tie in with public authority and state building, in which we examine the 
presence and roles of different types of institutions in land governance, the changes in laws 
and rules that apply on the ground, and the meaning of the state. Section 5 addresses what 
we see as the main challenges for land governance and the ways in which it may feed into 
state building. 
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2
Starting point of the research
Starting point for this research is that, in theory, land governance can be a potentially 
powerful avenue for post-conflict state building. The research was meant to explore to what 
extent and in what ways this potential is identified in ongoing land governance programmes 
in DRC and with what (potential) impacts. Through the interviews we mapped out how, 
through what mechanisms, and on what dimensions, land governance programmes affect 
public authority and the role of the state, both directly (as a specific target) and indirectly (as 
a side-effect of intervention). 
Land governance ties in with the way the state is ordered, how political authority is 
negotiated, and with the nature of citizenship and the relations between communities and 
the state (Boone 2007). If the state has the ambitions to exert its influence at the local 
level, land governance can be an important point of entry. It is in relation to land issues that 
ordinary citizens encounter their authorities. Dealing with issues such as land attribution and 
resolution of land disputes provides local and state institutions with ways of establishing or 
consolidating their authority, gaining legitimacy, and generating local people’s confidence 
and trust. Consequently, struggles over authority around land tie in directly with processes of 
everyday state formation (Berry 2002, Sikor & Lund 2009, Van der Haar 2001).
This suggests that, if conducted strategically, interventions in land governance may 
potentially contribute to the (re-) establishment of public authority and state building. This 
is highly relevant for post-conflict settings where stabilisation and the (re-)establishment 
of a functioning and legitimate state are key challenges. As suggested by Unruh (2003) 
addressing land conflict and land tenure security can play an important role in peace-building 
and the recreation of order after violent conflict.
In international policy debates, state building is defined by three key dimensions: state 
capacity, state legitimacy and state-society interaction. The OECD-DAC, for example, defines 
state building as ‘purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the 
state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between 
state and societal groups’ (OECD-DAC 2008:14). The state building discourse has thus 
moved beyond a narrow understanding of state building in terms of a technical process of 
institution building and has fore-grounded the space for dialogue on development problems, 
the rules and norms applied, and the kind of moral principles those are based on (e.g. DFID 
2005, OECD-DAC 2008). In this research, we keep these three dimensions in mind when 
assessing the way land governance interventions connect to state building.
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We also rely on theories of state formation to inform our analysis. Building on Joseph and 
Nugent’s (1994) proposal to understand the everyday processes by which state bureaucracies 
and political communities are created and penetrate society, and the bottom-up responses to 
this, we consider three dimensions: 
•	 Material presence of the state: The creation or re-enforcement of state institutions and 
capacities; 
•	 Rule sets: The enforcement of laws, rules, and norms designed and enforced by the state 
system;
•	 Symbolic level: The meaning that is being communicated along with these changes in state 
presence and the importance of state rules, and that may inform a new ‘idea of the state’ 
(Abrams 1977) and of how citizens see themselves in relation to the state.
State formation processes mean a stronger penetration of state presence (materially, 
institutionally – in terms of rules –, and symbolically) into regions that were wholly or partly 
outside of the reach of the central state. A key question is, therefore, how, state institutions 
and rules affect existing rule sets and forms of public authority that perform functions 
now claimed or re-claimed by the state. This is particularly relevant to land governance 
in DRC, which historically has been the terrain of customary authorities and consensual 
arrangements. An important question for this research is thus not only how land governance 
interventions affect the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions, but also what happens 
to other types of institutions that exist, and to the relation between them. In developing our 
argument on this point, we rely on the insights from the ongoing debates on hybrid political 
orders (Boege et al. 2009) and institutional multiplicity (DiJohn 2008, Van der Haar & Heijke 
2013).
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Land governance interventions in DRC: 
rationales and strategies
The land governance programmes we reviewed were mostly centred on addressing land 
conflict. In the context of intervention in the Kivus, land conflict and land tenure insecurity 
were framed as security issues. As the programmes developed, most organizations identified 
the need to look beyond land dispute mediation and address the wider governance system 
that allowed conflicts to emerge and grow violent. We first discuss interviewees’ observation 
on the nature of land conflicts, to continue with the governance challenges they identify, and 
then outline their key strategies.
Land conflicts in DRC
Many of the programmes we reviewed were driven by a concern with land conflict in DRC 
and centred on mediation of land conflicts and enhancing land tenure with the aim of 
contributing to stability. Land conflicts were framed as threats to overall stability. Programme 
officials refer to the high incidence of local level land disputes between neighbours and 
members of the same family, concerning boundaries of plots, inheritance, and irregular 
acquisition of land. Also mentioned were conflicts related to competing claims between 
communities and other claimants, such as that between the administration of the Virunga 
National Park and the surrounding farmers; and between pastoralists and farmers. A case 
in point here is the pygmy population whose claims on resources from the forest have been 
largely ignored and infringed upon. 
A key concern discussed in our interviews was disputes between large land-owners 
(concessionaires) and local communities. Originally, those concessions were given out by 
colonial authorities, irrespective of the fact that they were already occupied. During the 
‘Zairisation’ of land under Mobutu, they changed hands in non-transparent ways, often 
as appreciation for political support. More recently, new elites have also acquired such 
concessions from customary authorities, often in disputed ways, and to the detriment of the 
customary owners. The concessions are seen as a severe threat to farmers’ tenure security. 
The state only acknowledges claims to those concessions if they are used for agricultural 
production. For this, local farmers are offered contracts of ‘météage’ (including stipulations 
for share-cropping and labour on the owners’ land) which are often highly unfavourable 
and provide little security for the occupants. Interviewees pointed out that tenants may be 
kicked off their land when it is sold to a new owner, thereby becoming landless. And while 
for some of the concessions the lease has expired, occupants are still forced to pay part 
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of their harvest. In some regions, the presence of minerals in the subsoil has increased 
competition over land and has fuelled speculation. According to our respondents, in some 
cases, disputes around concessions have turned violent and are considered to pose a threat 
to security at large.
In the view of our respondents, the current conflictiveness of land is strongly related to the 
dynamics of civil war. The years of conflict have reduced the presence and capacities of the 
state judiciary system at the local level, but have also weakened customary institutions. Land 
conflict is thus partly framed as a problem of governance. During the war, land has turned 
into a source of speculation. Community members and representatives from the military 
have irregularly occupied plots of displaced people and refugees, which causes problems 
when the original owners return. In some cases, local power-holders have recruited militia 
or armed individuals to grab land or chase away tenants on concessions (see also Stearns 
2013). In other instances, customary authorities have incited youngsters to take up arms to 
protect community land. With the expected increase in the return of refugees, land problems 
might increase, and even turn violent, as happened in Lubero, where local communities 
opposed the return of Hutu that fled the territory in 1994 (Sylla 2013), who then joined armed 
groups. Interviewees observed that in some areas, militia have temporarily taken over land 
administration and given out titles, which are now disputed. 
In a number of cases, land conflicts are seen as linked to ethnicity. Historically, land rights 
of Kinyarwanda speakers (so-called ‘Banyamulenge’ in South Kivu and ‘Banyarwanda’ in 
North Kivu) have been disputed, as they were considered non-indigenous to the region and 
their citizenship was contested. This issue got heavily politicized over the years, and played a 
major role in the outburst of ethnic violence in Masisi in March 1993 (see on this Vlassenroot 
& Huggins 2005; Mamdani 2001; and ICG 2003). Especially after the Rwanda-masterminded 
rebellion of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) in 1998, Kinyarwanda 
speakers were perceived as affiliates of Rwanda, and as outsiders trying to appropriate land 
from indigenous communities. With the ongoing return of Congolese Tutsi from Rwanda, 
who had fled the violence in the 1990s, the land issue becomes politically important again. 
In Masisi (North Kivu) and Kalehe (South Kivu), claims are made that among those people 
returning from Rwanda and reclaiming land are also many people that do not originate from 
those areas at all, but that are Rwandese citizens. 
Site for displaced people.
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We found highly diverse views on the severity of the identity issue at the local level. Some 
interviewees saw it as ‘resolved’ by the new 2006 Constitution, which grants citizenship 
rights to the Kinyarwanda speakers and thus possibilities to legally acquire land. Others 
pointed out that identity issues are often exaggerated by politicians, and are less experienced 
at local level, or easily solved through local arrangements. On the other hand, referring in 
particular to regions like Masisi and Kalehe, the identity issue is frequently mentioned as an 
important dynamic, with Kinyarwanda speakers singled out as ‘land-grabbers’, or ‘disloyal’ 
Congolese. Others underscore that there are still demands from migrants for their own 
customary lands, as well as grudges caused by the nullification of Banyarwanda Territoires 
created by the RCD. And while some observe a relative tranquillity regarding such issues at 
the local level over the last few years, others doubt that local reconciliation has really taken 
place and that prejudices have been overcome.
Land governance challenges
Many intervention programmes held that land conflict was a ‘security’ issue that needed 
to be addressed to maintain the fragile peace. This resulted in projects for mediating land 
disputes evolving from the return of refugees and the reshuffle of properties in their absence, 
and reconciliation between ethnic communities. In the programmes reviewed, land disputes 
have increasingly become considered as a problem of governance, requiring not just dispute 
resolution interventions, but institutional changes. 
Interviewees point to the weaknesses of land governing institutions, contradictions in the 
legal framework governing land, confusion about the attributes of different land governing 
institutions, and lack of a consistent land policy. On the ground, development organizations 
observe a situation of confusion. Community members do not know whom to approach with 
their disputes and go to the military, the police, the local administration, or engage in forum 
shopping: they approach those institutions most likely to acknowledge their claims. This 
contributes to general feelings of tenure insecurity. In this connection it is also emphasised 
how political and elite manipulation of land governance, e.g. the insecure status of tenants 
on the concessions, feed instability. Ambiguity derives, furthermore, from the co-existence of 
Session to mediate a land dispute in 
Masisi, November 2013.
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different notions of property: some people claim for instance that they did not sell their land –
which would be culturally inacceptable- but rather conceded it for a limited period of time, and 
now claim it back.
 
Many interveners highlighted the ambiguities in the division of land governing roles between 
customary and statutory institutions. In the past, customary chiefs played an important role 
in administering land in their communities, protecting local land ownership and resolving 
land disputes. However, in the 1973 land law, land formally became the property of the 
Congolese state.
2
 All land was to be managed by the state, except terres communautaires, 
which would still be partly governed by customary authorities. The precise attributes of 
customary authorities would be set out in an Ordonnance Présidentielle,
3
 but this never 
materialised. This ‘gap’ in legislation on the precise roles of customary authorities is seen as 
a major cause of tenure insecurity. For instance, what about land attributions by customary 
authorities since that time? And what about customary land that has been sold, does it still 
fall under custom? This lack of clarity might even stimulate the sale of land by customary 
authorities, who try to profit from the land now that they still can.
Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, in practice, customary authorities in practice, continue 
to play a considerable role in local level land governance. Customarily, a Mwami would 
attribute land to the people of his community, often without documentary evidence, on 
the understanding that ‘ubutaka bwa nwami’ (‘land belongs to the customary chief’). Such 
attributions were considered indeterminate, and through the payment of yearly redevances 
this ‘contract’ was renewed. Such undetermined access agreements have been formally 
nullified by to the 1973 legislation. Yet, many chiefs continue to collect redevances coutumières. 
Also, at times they do not acknowledge titles given out by the state. Moreover, the new 
legislation is not known at the local level, which enables chiefs to continue operating 
as before. A complication is that since the Mobutu Presidency the chiefs have become 
integrated into the state administration. They now carry two responsibilities: as chiefs they 
guard the identity of their community and continue to operate as default land administrators; 
while as administrators they represent the state. The question is now, what should happen 
to the revenues they generate from land? While the state considers them responsible for 
generating revenues for the decentralized government, chiefs still claim their attributes 
regarding land, collect taxes and pocket the money from sales of land.
Among interveners, there is no agreement on the roles customary authorities and state 
authorities, respectively, should play in land governance, and different visions prevail 
about the need for strengthening them. A challenge is that both statutory and customary 
institutions suffer from a lack of local legitimacy and authority. Interviewees point out that 
when it comes to service provision (administration, development, and dispute resolution) 
the Congolese state is largely absent. Nonetheless, regarding land governance, the state 
plays an important role. Yet, the image of the state often presented is that of a predator, who 
can take and give land without accepting the responsibility for the consequences. Even then, 
various interviewees emphasise that stability requires the strengthening of state authority, 
including in land governance.
2 Article 53 of land law of 20 July 1973 states that : “la terre est la propriété exclusive, inaliénable et imprescriptible de l’État”.
3 Article 387 of the above land law.
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Likewise, some interviewees call the local legitimacy and authority of customary authorities 
into question. While their traditional power was based on the amount of land they availed of, 
as many of them have sold large parts of their community land, they have no land anymore 
to give out. Others point to a loss of their traditional authority, due to increasing access 
to education, or the participation of youth in militia, outside the reach of their traditional 
authorities. In addition, the sale of land by customary authorities has contributed to a loss 
of their legitimacy, as has their involvement in irregular transactions of land, like the sale 
of family land without one party knowing, or double attribution. Stories abound about 
customary authorities inciting to violence during the conflict, and about abuse or despotic 
behaviour towards fellow community members. For instance, in Kalehe, a newly installed 
chief tried to establish himself among the power-holders in his community by selling land of 
Congolese Tutsi that had fled to Rwanda. Some Mwami’s are perceived equally predatory as 
the state. For instance, a Mwami would move to town and sell the land of his community in 
complicity with the state land administration services. Interviewees observe that while in the 
past the Mwami was seen as a protector and conflict resolver, now he is often perceived as 
mainly interested in money, while some Bwami are not even residing in their communities 
any more. In practice, redevances are often no longer paid, while in many examples, people 
have started selling customary land. 
In contrast, other interviewees point out how in some places customary authorities certainly 
still have local standing, with the identity of the community embodied in the land and the 
chief. And while some interviewees consider their legitimacy simply too damaged to serve 
as a building block for effective land governance, others underscore the need to strengthen 
them. They point to the constitution that implicitly acknowledges them. More importantly, 
they see customary authorities fulfilling important land governing roles at the local level. 
“They fill a hiatus in the law and procedure of land acquisition: they know what land is 
‘empty’. They could prevent that even if you have received the necessary documents from the 
state local authorities do not recognize your claims”.
4 It is also pointed out that customary 
tenure is more secure, as the attribution by a customary chief is still considered perpetual 
while the state can always retake land given out.
The question is finally whether local authorities, customary or state are able to handle 
imminent, new tensions around land, related to refugee return and commercial pressures on 
land. UNHCR estimates that there are still half a million Congolese refugees in neighbouring 
countries, as well as 2.5 million internally displaced.
5
 Their return to their communities 
will certainly pose new challenges in terms of contestation on land and its governance. A 
question posed is for instance whether resettlement might be necessary. Another challenge is 
the increasing interest of investors in land and the possible resources under it. Further, while 
in the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) agreement has been 
reached about free movement in the region, some individuals in the Congolese government 
continue to resist such possibilities.
4 Déogratias Buuma Namira, APC, 24 November 2013.
5 UNHCR website, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c366&submit=GO (visited 17 March 2014). 
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Political reforms and their implications
Interviewees also addressed the impact of the broader political framework on local problems 
of land conflict and tenure insecurity. Their assessment of contemporary political initiatives 
to deal with land problems is highly varied. Recently, political debate on land governance 
reform in DRC gained momentum, with the President calling for a comprehensive land 
reform in his inaugural address in December 2011. This was followed by the creation of a 
Land Reform Steering Committee, and the adoption of a road map for land reform deriving 
from a nationwide stakeholder workshop in July 2012. The key messages were: to deal with 
land disputes and set up transitional measures to improve land governance, reconcile 
customary with statutory land management and to develop a new legal framework based 
on a comprehensive and consultative land policy process (for more details, see Sylla 2013). 
Apparently there is a certain level of political will. One of the most concrete outcomes of the 
process so far is the acceptance of a new ‘Loi du Code Agricole’ in 2010, which gives local 
land committees in the communities a role in land allocation and recognition of claims, and 
foresees the creation of a cadastre. 
An important strategy to improve state service delivery, decentralization, is also relevant with 
regard to land. Provisions in the 2006-Constitution provide the provinces with competences 
in granting and administrating titles, and acknowledges customary authority. The Ministry 
of Land Affairs has promoted the creation of sub-offices at the community level (Brigades 
Foncières) to facilitate local communities’ access to land administration services. Worth 
mentioning is the establishment of a Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected 
Areas (STAREC) in 2009, which should contribute to national peace and reconciliation, 
notably: Security and Restoration of State Authority, Humanitarian and Social Assistance, 
and Economic Recovery. It has resulted in the establishment of structures at the level of the 
‘groupement’, the so-called ‘Comités Locales Permanentes de Conciliation’ (CLPC), which deal  
with conflict at this level, and in practice thus often deal with land issues. If this local body 
fails, STAREC may take over and refer cases to the province. 
As yet, assessments of the outcomes of those reforms are varied. Though some consider it 
promising that there is now a certain level of political will, other interviewees comment that 
government prioritization is changing continuously and there have been several delays in the 
establishment of the Steering Committee. Moreover, questions are raised about the actual 
effectiveness and unintended impacts of the reforms. 
For instance, to some, the Loi Agricole seems to legitimize large landownership and may 
make it difficult for small-holders to officially acquire lease-hold. Others point out, however, 
that the stipulations create a level of security of tenure for 5 years as well as in case of sale of 
the concession. Moreover, they consider it as a reasonably good compromise, and maybe the 
highest attainable, considering the firm representation of concession holders in government, 
who would surely not have accepted more radical proposals like land redistribution. 
Some interviewees observed that so far, STAREC receives little support from the central 
government, and with its limited funds finds it very difficult to be actually present in the field. 
Some interviewees worried further that the CLPC are often politicized and dominated by the 
customary chiefs.
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Interviewees observe that little progress has been made in actually realizing decentralization 
of land services provision. An obstacle is financial decentralization, as no agreement about 
the division of revenues is in place yet. Some organizations observe that political will for 
decentralization remains limited, as it will definitely affect existing patronage relationships. 
Yet, some difficulties to overcome have to do with the organizational set-up proposed, for 
instance regarding the lines of responsibility, and for instance the extent to which provincial 
authorities may be able to fulfil responsibilities attributed to them. The introduction of a 
decentralized cadastre, in the form of Brigades Foncières, lags behind. They lack equipment 
and means, are technically weak because of lack of training, while their staff is not paid. 
Decentralization nonetheless has an impact on authority and legitimacy of different 
institutions at the local level. Customary authorities resist decentralization, as they fear it 
might result in new administrative entities that fall outside their responsibilities (like urban 
neighbourhoods, and immigrant secteurs). This fear also plays a role in the introduction of 
the Brigades Foncières, which are often seen as competitors by the customary authorities. 
Moreover, the outcomes of decentralization are difficult to predict. The decentralization of 
the juridical system through the establishment of Tribunaux de Paix in the territories may 
contribute to a loss of legitimacy of customary authorities in managing land disputes, as 
their judgements are considered of limited value by the Tribunaux. Yet, the latter remain less 
accessible than the customary authorities. On the other hand, complementariness between 
institutions may come about, like in Masisi, where a Juge de Paix was willing to ratify the 
results of a mediation effort by customary authorities.
6
Unfortunately, as interviewees observed, decentralization does little to clarify the ambiguity 
about land governing attributes of state and customary authorities. Formally, decentralization 
would make the customary chief part of the executive body in the local administration, 
responding to elected local conseils de chefferie/secteur. Yet, such a more subordinate 
position does not necessarily go well with the traditional respect the customary chiefs enjoy 
6 Journee d’’Analyse des Conflits entre les Agriculteurs, Concessionaires et les Eleveurs, Masisi, 21 November 2013, facilité par UN-Habitat.
A poster explaining decentralization.
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in the communities. As one interviewee expressed it, “the legislation of 2006 may result 
in the establishment of an ensemble of micro-monarchies”,
7
 It may imply that customary 
authorities may take on significant roles in land governance with few mechanisms in place 
to ensure accountable. Moreover, traditional respect may result in that customary chiefs may 
promote the election of conseilleurs that still follow his ruling. In practice, if traditional chiefs 
do not function well in the executive, they can hardly be replaced. Exemplary is the fact that 
Tribunals hardly ever convict a Mwami, or implemented a conviction. “As a consequence, 
traditional tenure insecurity continues”.
8
 In addition, customary chiefs still tend to consider 
that revenues collected at the local level are for them rather than for the state administration. 
Various interviewees thus point to the need to delink the local administration from the 
customary authorities, or promote a more symbolic role for them.
A key question is to what extent the reforms will be locally accepted and implemented. 
As one interviewee pointed out: “land is too much étatisée”, meaning that proposals for 
land governance in DRC are too state-centred. Much of legislation is based on imported 
ideas, and the debate on reform remains an issue of a few intellectuals in Kinshasa. The 
population cannot identify itself with the outcomes. To some interviewees, this is the core 
of the problem: “how to make the procedures more participatory and how to assure that the 
population appropriates the reforms?”.
9 
Concerns about the current policy reforms urge some organisations to continue lobbying for 
reforms and pressing the government for keeping land issues on the agenda, while others 
opt for strengthening the search for solutions at the local level. 
Intervention strategies in land governance
Based on their assessments of land conflict, tenure insecurity and governance challenges, 
organisations intervening in land and land governance have developed different types of 
intervention. In a simplifying manner, the following categories can be identified:
10
•	 Mediation and land conflict resolution at the local level. Such interventions are based on 
the assumption that land disputes are a key challenge to local stability and security. 
•	 Examples include the land dispute mediation work of UN-Habitat and the Life and 
Peace Institute, and their Congolese partners. Some of this work also includes 
involving politicians at higher levels.
•	 Training and facilitation of local dispute mediation institutions. Such a strategy starts from 
an observed lack of conflict resolving capacity at the local level. The ambition is generally 
to assure inclusiveness, inviting different institutions (local associations, churches, elders, 
state administration, police) present in the community, rather than focussing on one 
particular type of authorities.  
Examples include: 
7 Loochi Muzaliwa, LPI, 26 November 2013.
8 Severin Mugangu Matabono, 26 November 2013.
9 Loochi Muzaliwa, LPI, 26 November 2013.
10 Descriptions of intervention strategies are partially taken from an inventory of land-related interventions by le groupe de travail Habitat, Terre, 
et Propriété de ONU-Habitat.
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•	 the activities of APC, which has a programme to enhance the involvement of the Cadres 
de Dialogue et de Médiation (CDM) in the prevention and mediation of land disputes; 
•	 ADEPAE, which has a project to strengthen community capacities in conflict 
management and promotion of peace in Fizi and Uvira territories; 
•	 UN-Habitat, which also strengthens the CDM in land dispute mediation, context 
analysis, and lobbying, and gives support to the provincial government to initiate 
community land dialogue with traditional authorities and community leaders in North 
Kivu to facilitate return of refugees from Rwanda; 
•	 LPI, which facilitates inter-communal dialogue. 
•	 Monitoring and research of land disputes, to inform interventions in this field and 
facilitate lobbying. 
For instance:
•	 AAP has a programme to monitor land disputes and violations of children’s rights. 
•	 LPI conducts participatory action research on inter-ethnic conflicts related to land 
management; 
•	 International Alert trains local organisations in doing research and publishes reports 
on land issues in eastern DRC. 
•	 Training on legislation, considering that local lack of knowledge about actual state 
legislation enables manipulation by opportunistic outsiders, while knowledge about state 
legislation may contribute to the protection of women. 
Examples include:
•	 the programme of AAP, which tries to create awareness of the l’Edit provincial on the 
division of responsibilities between customary chiefs, land chiefs and small producers, 
and conducts sensibilisation in the communities on how to get land locally registered; 
•	 APC works on the promotion of women rights through training on the Family Code and 
Resolution 1325; 
•	 NRC has information campaigns on housing, land and property rights with the aim of 
preventing conflicts, as well as training on state legislation; 
•	 ADEPAE trains state officials and humanitarian organizations on regional legal 
frameworks regarding displaced people.
Announcement for a training on 
prevention and resolution of land 
disputes.
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•	 Provision of resources and capacity building to local land governing institutions, on the 
assumption that those lack means and that their accessibility is limited. This includes for 
example physical infrastructure and means of transport.  
Examples include:
•	 the support of UN-Habitat to the land administration, consisting of: training in ADR, 
topography and mapping system, facilitating dialogue with key stakeholders (traditional 
chiefs, local leaders), provision of topography equipment, raising awareness through 
radio broadcasts. Support is given to the Provincial Ministry of Land Affairs to deal with 
complex land disputes (Kitchanga) and to coordinate interventions. 
•	 Promoting and facilitating local registration of land, on the assumption that a lack of 
tenure security threatens livelihoods, or may contribute to land disputes.  
Examples include:
•	 the work of the Cooperation Suisse to introduce written documents for land 
administration, through a decentralized acknowledgement of customary claims; 
•	 APC tries to strengthen tenure security by strengthening customary land contracts, and 
assisting people to acquire titles; 
•	 LPI, that assists its local partners APC, RIO & Adepae in getting in place certificates of 
customary land occupation.
•	 Lobbying at the level of national and provincial authorities on land legislation and reform.  
Emphasis in this is on the ambiguity of regulations and the attributions of different 
land governing institutions, such as the division of responsibilities between state 
and customary institutions, or irregularities in the attributions of land, such as the 
concessions.  
Examples include:
•	 the work of Forum des Amis de la Terre (FAT) and Fédération des Organisations de 
Producteurs du Congo (FOPAC), who played an active role in lobbying and bringing 
together other actors from civil society for the ‘Loi de Code Agricole’ and facilitated the 
agreement of a Code of Conduct for customary chiefs in North Kivu; 
•	 NRC lobbies for temporary or permanent land access for IDPs and returnees. 
•	 Facilitating policy debate on land reform. Creating venues in which different stakeholders 
discuss key issues in land policy, but also facilitating access of stakeholders to debates 
elsewhere.
•	  An important role in this has for instance been played by UN-Habitat, who supported 
the nation-wide consultation workshop on land reform in 2012, and provides technical 
assistance to the Ministry of Land Affairs since 2011. 
•	 Coordinating interventions on land issues, as it is observed that organizations sometimes 
have contradictory strategies, to increase impact and leverage on policy making, and to 
prevent forum-shopping by contestants in land disputes.  
For instance:
•	 UN-Habitat gives support to the Provincial Ministry of Land Affairs to coordinate 
interventions, and facilitate exchanges amongst interveners at both provincial and 
national levels
18
  4
The potential linkages between 
land-related programmes and state 
building
In this section we explore in which ways interviewees see potential linkages between land 
governance and institutional strengthening or state building. After providing a general 
assessment of how they perceive those links, we analyse interventions in terms of how 
they link specifically to the creation of public authority, rule systems, and the symbolic 
understanding of public authority. 
Land, governance and state building: recognising the links
As discussed above, many interviewees consider that land disputes are a matter of 
governance. Consequently, they emphasised the need to explicitly work on land governance, 
rather than on the mediation of individual land dispute only. As interviewees observed: 
“You can’t sustainably solve land issues if you only work on dispute resolution”.
11
 Mediation 
and other mechanisms are seen to offer temporary solutions, to diffuse tension and bring 
together contending parties, but in addition a long term approach is seen as necessary: 
improving land governance systems. 
However, our impression was that this awareness has not yet been fully reflected in 
intervention practices, as is also acknowledged by the interviewees: “Our interventions in this 
by themselves are not sufficient: there is a need to strengthen authorities and responsibilize 
them for the matter”
12
; “the mediation in land conflicts is band aid, not a durable solution. 
That would require long-term institutional support”.
13
The assumption that intervention programmes on land might have effects on local 
governance and local state building more in general – from which we started our research 
– resonated strongly with the interviewees. For instance, all participants to the verification 
workshop agreed that: “Land governance is the ideal avenue for (re-) establishing a social 
contract between the Congolese state and its citizens”.
14
As one interviewee remarked, “If 
the state would work in a positive way on land governance, this might have an enormous 
11 Déogratias Bashibirhana, Cooperation Suisse, 25 November 2013.
12 George Bwema, ICLA Sud Kivu, 25 November 2013.
13 Oumar Sylla, UN-Habitat, 28 November 2013.
14 “La gouvernance foncière est une avenue idéale pour (ré-)établir le contrat social entre l’état congolaise et ses citoyens”, Atelier de restitution, 
Goma, 29 November 2013.
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impact on the confidence in the state”.
15
Another speculated that re-legitimating the state is 
even one of the actual objectives of the reforms in land governance currently discussed by 
the government. Others see the problems of land governance – e.g. the continuing ambiguity 
and contradictions in legislation and attributes of authorities – as exemplary for how 
governance in DRC operates.
Some interveners saw direct links between land programmes and state building. As one 
interviewee pointed out, “by strengthening land governance, you strengthen governance 
in general, as well as the image people have of their state. Land is the moment where 
people are in contact with their state. And if 80% of the population lives off the land, if you 
work in this field, your interventions on governance have an impact”.
16
An effect on state 
building could be reached by different means, as demonstrated by the following quotes: 
“If you specify clearly to whom land belongs in rural areas, and when it becomes under the 
authority of the state, this means reestablishment of state”
17
; “Establishing conflict resolution 
through better regulation and strengthening the judicial system is state building by itself (...) 
Standardizing the fiches used for administration makes it possibility for the state to control 
and survey: this is state building”.
18
In these quotes we see reflected the different dimensions 
of state formation that we distinguish: state capacity of control, state law, as well as – in the 
first quote – the image of the state. It should be added that interviewees did not embrace 
the idea of state building without hesitation. There was a strong concern with the risk of 
strengthening a predatory, self-interested regime. 
Though the potential for land governance programmes to feed into state building was 
recognised, state building was not an explicit ambition of most programmes. An exception 
is the pilot programme of the Swiss Cooperation, which – according to the representative we 
interviewed – has the explicit ambition to contribute to new, positive images of the Congolese 
state, by working on the behaviour and reputation of state representatives at the local level, 
for instance by discussing moral and corrupt behaviour in their trainings. Other examples 
are FAT’s initiative to arrive at the Provincial Edict for regulating customary authorities and 
land management, involving parliamentarians and provincial authorities; or the work of UN-
15 Tobias Petrelius, LPI, 19 November 2013.
16 George Bwema, ICLA Sud Kivu, 25 November 2013.
17 Tharcisse Kayera, ADEPAE, 25 November 2013.
18 Tharcisse Kayera, ADEPAE, 25 November 2013.
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Habitat to facilitate dialogue between the land administration and traditional authorities on 
their respective attributes, for instance, on the need for the land administration to involve 
traditional authorities when carrying out a land vacancy inquiry. The wider ambition of the 
programme is to put in place an integrated land administration system, reconciling statutory 
with customary laws.
In most programmes, state building was not specifically targeted, but believed to be an 
almost natural outcome of the efforts in the field of land governance, which requires no 
special efforts. Representatives of various programmes for instance assumed that in practice, 
public administration and land governance are so closely connected due to the fact that 
customary chiefs have become part of the state administration, and thus that strengthening 
of customary authorities and institutions means strengthening the state. State building was 
then seen in terms of changes in the performance of public authorities in general, rather than 
in re-establishing the Congolese state. 
I. Public authority and institutions: Who is in charge of land 
governance?
Land governance is clearly a field in which multiple institutions play a role: the re-emerging 
state, customary institutions, and – increasingly – interveners and the institutions they 
create to deal with land governance challenges. The interventions analyzed both act upon 
the existing customary institutions and on the re-emerging state institutions, and create new 
bodies to deal with land disputes. Our findings suggest that:
•	 many interventions include the creation of new bodies or committees to fill gaps in land 
governance, especially in land dispute resolution, and representing all segments of local 
society;
•	 in some cases customary authorities are targeted with a view to making their role in land 
governance more effective as well as more inclusive and accountable;
•	 direct investment in state authorities at the local level is limited, but not absent.
Though all of these actions aim to strengthen institutions at the local level, the impact on 
state building is not always considered explicitly. There is some concern that the strong 
presence of NGOs might undermine the re-establishment of the state (known as ‘crowding-
out’ effect). Others propose that strengthening institutionalisation in itself contributes to 
state building, provided that the role of customary or community-based institutions (whether 
newly created or rooted in tradition) is eventually recognized and embedded in the state 
structure.
One of the most visible ways of supporting the re-establishment of the state is through 
the creation of physical infrastructure. This makes the state visible at the local level and 
underpins a strengthening of its capacity. This approach was clearly reflected in the 
programme ‘Restauration de l’autorité de l’état’ of the governmental programme STAREC. 
Other programmes entailed support for the construction of offices, materials, and means 
of transport. Many interviewees saw this focus on physical infrastructure as limited. They 
suggested that this infrastructure does not by itself ensure that institutions become more 
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effective, and may do little to strengthen the legitimacy of authorities. Others considered 
that alack of good working conditions fosters abuse and corruption; hence, support 
to infrastructure is part of strengthening legitimacy. Overall, investments in physical 
infrastructure were defended as part of institution-building which also included other 
components, mostly on the level of capacities.
Increasingly, domestic and international NGOs and interveners in DRC step into land 
governance to compensate for the absence of the state. Their interventions affect the roles 
and presence of the largely absent but re-emerging state institutions as well as the customary 
authorities and community-based arrangements, which have roots in history but are 
questioned and changing.
In those efforts, there has been a change in strategy, in that international intervening 
organisations increasingly shift responsibilities to local partners. Interviewees mention that 
international agencies initially implemented land conflict resolutions programs themselves. 
With a view to enhancing local capacity, they have handed over responsibilities to local 
organisations, while the international organizations provide assistance, help to refer cases to 
appropriate institutions, or play a role in more complex disputes. 
For instance, UN-Habitat formerly had 10 mediators travelling to different 
communities, but now supports local bodies in doing this work. The role of 
UN-Habitat itself has shifted towards complementing such efforts of local 
organizations, for instance by drawing on its connections in Kinshasa and abroad, 
when local disputes have turned too complex to be addressed locally because of 
the involvement stakeholders from outside the communities. 
 
Various organisations established local committees to implement their programmes. This 
has resulted in the establishment of a wide variety of local committees, to mention a few: des 
Noyaux de Resolution de Conflits Fonciers (AAP), Commission d’Acceuil et de Reinsertation (NRC-
Signpost for a local dispute mediation committee 
established by a development organization.
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ICLA), Cadre de dialogue et de mediation (LPI), Committees de Mediation et de Defense des 
Droits Humaines (Heritiers de la Justice). These newly established bodies primarily take up a 
role in conflict resolution. To his end, they are trained on mediation of land disputes and on 
legislation. Increasingly, participatory and action research appears to become a strategy. 
Interveners created these bodies because they perceived an ‘institutional gap’ in land dispute 
resolution which needed to be addressed urgently. The Conceils Inter-communautaires pour 
la Transformation des Conflicts, a structure promoted by LPI, were introduced because of the 
limited presence of the juridical system at community level. Likewise, when NRC-ICLA in 
2004-2006 started to assist returning refugees to re-establish in their home communities in 
some cases there were no local authorities in place, and so-called Commissions de Protection 
de Déplacées (CPD), were established to register the population, deal with disputes, and 
take care of those whose land was occupied. Later, when the police and local administrators 
returned, the structure transformed into Commissions d’Acceuil et de Reinsertation (CAR) 
which focussed specifically on land issues.
In many instances, however, functioning institutions were present. Intervening organizations 
were aware of that, but considered their capacities and legitimacy limited and felt the need 
to introduce a new organisational form. New committees are promoted in order to include 
a broader representation of the population. The idea is that women and youth, but also 
IDPs, may have limited representation at the community level, and the committees ensure 
they have a platform. Most of these committees aim to include existing authorities as well: 
the influential people in the village, customary chiefs, schoolteachers, representatives of the 
churches, the police, and the military. One reason to include this diversity of local power-
holders is to avoid institutional competition and forum-shopping. In some programmes, the 
ambition is to strengthen locally existing institutions, rather than introducing new bodies, 
while still seeking to achieve broader participation. IFDP for instance works to re-establish 
the former conseils de village, however, this time with women and youth participating.
One concern expressed in the interviews is that interventions might be de-linked from the 
wider efforts of state building. There was a general concern with the lack of coordination 
amongst organizations and the failure to link them to the state, with for instance provincial 
authorities not being informed about programmes. Some were concerned about the lack of 
formal recognition and incorporation of newly established bodies. Ideally, new institutions 
would become part of a decentralized (land) governance structure. Lack of recognition and 
incorporation would be a threat to the sustainability of the committees, who so far have 
relied on external funding. Some organisations already seek for formal recognition. APC 
is exploring how their Cadres de Dialogue et de Médiation may become recognized as an 
official mechanism by the state. The same counts for IFDP in Kabare and ASOP in Walumbu. 
Interveners are however sometimes worried about the extent to which such insertion will 
change the voluntary and non-political character of the established structures. 
Some organisations explicitly aim at strengthening the legitimacy of customary authorities 
Examples are the initiatives of IFDP and Cooperation Suisse. As a representative of AAP 
explains: “the customary chiefs can’t be circumvented. At the same time, there is a need to 
fight injustices from the past”.
19
 Others consider that by training them in state legislation 
19 Eddy Byamungu, AAP, 19 November 2013.
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their local authority can be strengthened. In the Groups de Réflexion sur les Conflits Fonciers, 
promoted by IFDP, the chef de village is appointed as the moderator, which contributes to 
his local authority. In most cases, however, customary authorities are involved as just one 
group among other community representatives (e.g. in the different councils established 
and the trainings given), and there is no specific ambition to strengthen their authority and 
legitimacy. Yet, the expectation is that through their participation, and through the fact that 
training workshops provide a forum for expressing discontent about abuse of power, their 
behaviour nonetheless may change.
Next to customary chieftaincies, in some communities the so-called Baraza inter-
communautaire is mentioned as a potential player in land governance. This structure was 
created in 1998 as a provincial branch of a governmental peace commission, gathering 
leaders from nine major ethnic groups in North Kivu, to resolve local conflicts before they 
would turn violent. Though government-initiated, it considers itself independent. Until 2004, 
the Baraza resolved various ethnic disputes and convinced combatants to lay down their 
weapons. Since then, their importance has diminished. Nonetheless, in some communities 
the Baraza is said to be still effective and filling the gap in mediating issues across 
communities. Other interviewees doubt their representativeness, local legitimacy, and their 
independence from politicians.
Few organizations aim directly at strengthening the institutions of the state, for instance, 
through support to decentralization. Though some acknowledge the presence of capable 
people in the judiciary sector, there seems to be a lack of confidence in the state in general. 
Consequently, strengthening state authorities at the local level seems to be mainly the work 
of the provincial government. A challenge identified here is that rather than strengthening 
state authority, interventions such as the establishment of new land governing bodies may 
even be detrimental to state building. By taking over responsibilities from the state, notably 
in the resolution of land conflicts, they might undermine rather than rebuild the capacities of 
the state.
Some organisations propose to strengthen the role of customary authorities in land 
governance, as a way to contribute to state building. They do not see a stark distinction 
between state and non-state authority. Rather, they consider for instance that the integration 
of customary authorities into state administration at the local level is a de facto given, but 
argue that it needs to be made effective in the field of land governance. More concretely, 
the chefferie and secteur should be trained in land governance, and their roles in land 
governance should be legally recognised. As one interviewee observed, “if chiefs become 
part of the decentralized administration, strengthening their roles regarding land implies a 
strengthening of the state by the very fact of acknowledging customary authorities”.
20
 Various 
other interviewees pointed out how better collaboration between cadastre and customary 
chiefs would secure tenure and strengthen the reputation of the state. 
An example of a strategy working from such a notion is the (pilot) land 
securitisation programme of the Swiss Cooperation that works together with 
the cadastral services and the customary authorities at the level of the chefferie. 
20 Déogratias Bashibirhana, Cooperation Suisse, 25 November 2013.
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“Our aim is not to strengthen custom, but to contribute to a new image of the 
state. This requires supporting all authorities. But also their behaviour as they lose 
legitimacy as a result of that. Through raising the moral standards of the officers 
of land services their reputation has to be strengthened”.
21
Contemporary literature on state building and governance emphasises the roles non-state 
armed actors (like militia and rebel leaders) may play in services-provision (Vlassenroot 
& Raeymakers 2008, see also: Raeymaekers et al. 2008). We did, however, not encounter 
examples of this in our interviews. We were told, however, that there has been cooperation 
between community members and armed groups to avoid land dispossession in South Kivu. 
Interviewees also mentioned temporal arrangements in which insurgents took over land 
administration and started re-allocating land; yet, such arrangements were reversed? as the 
insurgency demised. 
We have stressed here the interventions aimed at local-level institutions. However, 
interventions also target higher levels of governance. For instance, they facilitate or support 
platforms at the provincial or national level. Amongst others, AAP convenes the Sous-
Coordination Foncier in Masisi Territoire, which is a coming together of different bodies, 
associations, and local NGOs working on land in the Territoire; while UN-Habitat supports 
government-NGO encounters at District level, facilitates land coordination groups in North 
Kivu, assists the Ministry of Land Affairs, and facilitated a national consultation on land 
reform in 2012.
II. Laws, rules, norms: Which rules apply in land governance?
We suggested above that land governance interventions act on the rules, norms and 
conventions that govern land access, land acquisition, and transfer on the ground. We found 
the interventions reviewed to touch directly on the legitimacy of customary arrangements 
and notions of property vis-à-vis state laws and regulations. One the one hand, interventions 
showed a bias towards formal legislation and attributes, emphasising the need for more 
knowledge on these issues. On the other hand, there were efforts to strengthen the 
recognition and effectiveness of customary arrangements.
The interviews show that many interventions aim to contribute to tenure security and 
conflict prevention through training on legislation and the formal attributes of different 
institutions. This is based on the assumption that the lack of knowledge of state legislation 
at the local level feeds dispute and abuse. Moreover, such interventions hope to contribute 
to the protection of segments of the population with weaker rights to land, notably women. 
Various interveners train community representatives, often through the diverse committees 
established, on the legal rights of daughters to a part of the family inheritance or of widows 
to get a part of the land of their deceased husband. 
Key problems were identified, however, with the implementation of the existing legislation. 
State legislation is seen to work mostly for the interests of politicians rather than the 
21 Déogratias Bashibirhana, Cooperation Suisse, 25 November 2013.
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interests of the communities. It is also observed that state authorities themselves neglect 
state law that is in place to protect smallholders: “Authorities act like bandits: they may 
destroy the houses on land for which they have handed out titles themselves!”
22
 
Some organizations do lobby work, at national and provincial level, to change state 
legislation and promote the protection of smallholders. The way the new Loi de Code 
Agricole took shape, is considered a relative success, influenced by the lobbying efforts 
of organizations like FOPAC and FAT. One of their proposals was to agree on a Code de 
Travail for concessions (including a maximum percentage of the harvest to be paid to the 
concession owner) as well as an acte de reconnaissance given out by the customary authorities 
to certify tenancy status on land in the concessions. To avoid the problem that state 
legislation may undermine customary regulation a number of organisations lobby for the 
acknowledgement of the roles of customary institutions in administrating land.
In North Kivu, such efforts have resulted in an Edit Provincial, a provincial bylaw 
that clarifies the attributes of different types of institutions in land governance. 
AAP and FAT engaged the provincial authorities on this issue, taking along 
customary authorities in the process. The Edit grants customary authorities prime 
responsibility for land administration, until an Ordonnance Présidentielle settles 
the issue more permanently. It is hoped that this will strengthen the juridical 
value of land grants given out by customary authorities, even if it is not a formal 
title. The Edit also stipulates the procedures which customary authorities are to 
follow when attributing land-, and sets conditions for the payment of redevances 
coutumières. This is a means to make customary authority more accountable and 
counter some of its current loss of legitimacy in some places. Opinions on the Edit 
are mixed, however, with some organisations seeing it as potentially reinforcing 
feudal relationships, or as pushed forward by local, autochthonous communities 
to reassert their hold on the land to the disadvantage of the Rwandophone 
population and migrants. 
A number of initiatives focus on strengthening what is there locally in terms of norms, 
rules and conventions, seeking the backing of state recognition. The cooperation Suisse is 
starting a pilot in Walungu and Kabare with the introduction of written documents for land 
administration, through a decentralized acknowledgement of customary claims. This is done 
by giving the Chef de Foncier (who is not a customary authority, but a government appointee) 
a role in agreeing customary kalinzi contracts, through which subjects may access customary 
land by paying tribute to the chief. While such a customary contract may secure tenure by 
giving perpetual rights and creating a relationship between giver and taker, the involvement 
of a state authority enables control and so may prevent exploitation between giver and taker. 
Codification of existing customary norms and rules is another strategy to strengthen the 
effectiveness of local arrangements. In many places, community-level arrangements exist – 
referred to as ‘consensual’- that are backed by the customary authorities. As a representative 
of ICLA Sud Kivu explained: “for instance, Babembe custom may explicitly say that land 
belongs to the community; the Mwami is the manager, and he doesn’t have the rights to sell 
22 22  Déogratias Buuma Namira, APC, 24 November 2013.
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the land. Another example is that in Babembe culture a widow has a right on the land of her 
deceased husband, and the Mwami and his captains have to protect this right”.
23
 Recognising 
these consensual agreements may be an avenue to better protect the rights of communities 
and within communities. At the same time, organizations are aware of the risk that writing 
down ‘custom’ might fixate the rules and limit the capacity of the local system to adapt to 
new situations. During the codification process, custom is not only recorded but also, or 
primarily, discussed and criticized. Reportedly, this has led to adaptations, like the installation 
of a female chief in a community in Masisi, or the acceptance in some communities that 
immigrant (‘allochtones’) populations are allowed to access land of the community. State 
recognition of customary arrangements remains a challenge, however. In Fizi, APC and LPI 
made an attempt at codification, but worried about the lack of judicial value of customary 
regulations.
Another strategy, promoted by diverse organizations like RIO, Adepae, Arche d’Alliance, APC, 
POLE institute, and LPI, is to facilitate space for reflection among local state and non-state 
authorities to consider how to deal with (land-related) challenges. In Kalehe, local authorities 
arrived at agreements on how to assure access of land to everybody, including immigrants to 
the region. These initiatives aim to establish and promote local norms on land governance, 
inspired by a broader concern with ‘good governance’. The challenge, however, again is how 
to assure that such proposals may be acknowledged in state legislation. 
Interveners see a couple of challenges regarding their contributions to the reformulation 
of rules, norms and conventions. A first problem is that it is very hard to come up with 
proposals that are relevant and effective everywhere, given the diversity of local settings. 
Customary norms and arrangements vary quite strongly across eastern DRC, and on top 
of that the situation is in flux. We mentioned already the diversity regarding the role of the 
customary chiefs. In some places, the case is still that the ‘Chef de village dirige le village’ 
(the village chief runs the village), and the Mwami is still in charge of land, while in others 
land governing responsibility is decentralized to the chefs de groupement/family. In some 
groupements and villages, the chef coutumier has a broad role, including the distribution of 
land, conflict resolution and local administration, while in others, his responsibility is limited 
to land matters only.
As some of the above examples show, there is thus capacity and interest among interveners 
to maintain local arrangements around land. While the emphasis of most intervention 
programmes is on training on state legislation, there is a number of efforts to strengthen 
existing norms, as well as local capacities for arriving at certain norms and conventions. The 
question remains what introducing state law in the communities implies for the legitimacy 
of local norms, institutions, and decision making, and to what extent these are harnessed 
or instead undercut: a question which is seldom asked by the interveners. A good example 
here is the Edit, which aims to strengthen customary institutions, but risks to prescribe from 
outside how they should behave. 
23 Beyond shaping institutions and rule sets, land-related interventions act on the idea of the
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III. Symbolic meaning: How do people relate to the state?
state and on the relationship between the state and its citizens. The image of the state is 
addressed explicitly in some programmes under the header of ‘state legitimacy’ but is rarely 
an objective in itself. Some interviewees see this topic as outside their scope and interest. 
Others, however, recognised the possible effects of their work on how local citizens relate to 
the state.
Various representatives of organizations pointed to the problem that state officials tend to 
consider the state as the supreme ruler rather than as serving the people. Many state officials 
do not consider that the state should be there for its citizens and do not work from a sense of 
public responsibility. Such notions of the state are mostly traced to the colonial period, when 
individuals that collaborated with the state were given positions of authority, which continued 
under Mobutu’s Zairinisation. Consequently, people tend to have negative assessments of 
the state, as a predatory force, whose actions and legislation is there to serve power-holders. 
Such general distrust of the state is fuelled by experiences with corrupt individual state 
officials. In a similar way, the army is not seen as part of the state, protecting the citizens, but 
as a diffuse group of individual units representing their own interests.
The experience is that similar notions of sovereignty are also present among some customary 
authorities, who have come to regard themselves as supreme owners of the lands in their 
territory, rather than as the protector of community land. This was for instance illustrated 
by representatives of Heritiers de la Justice, who referred to a customary chief who was 
unwilling to accept mediation from them, as he claimed “ici c’est moi qui dirige” (“here, it’s 
me who is in charge”). Such a notion of customary authority may have historical roots, but 
might also have been copied from state authorities.
Various organizations aim to transform perceptions about leadership and public 
responsibility, for instance promoting the idea that authority should be based on 
performance rather than descent. In land issues, state and traditional authorities should take 
up the responsibility to protect people’s rights. “The state should not see itself as power only 
(like in Mobutu times) but realise that people should have land while the state regulates. 
If the state needs land for development, it needs to buy land and compensate people – not 
so much the Mwami”.
24
 Many organizations also consider the need to facilitate structures 
of participation, that allow citizens to enter into debate with their political representatives. 
However, the question is how this might be done. 
A few organizations also mentioned the need to transform prevailing notions about what 
defines a community. Redefining the role of customary authorities may play a central role 
in this. Communities in eastern DRC now often define themselves on basis of ethnicity and 
presumed autochthony, and access to land often remains based on allegiance to customary 
authorities to which redevances are being paid. By introducing the notion of taxes, which 
people pay to contribute to the development of their community, communities may be re-
imagined. As a representative from ADEPAE observed, decentralization of land governance 
could contribute to this, as it would transfer land governing responsibilities to the level of 
24 George Bwema, ICLA Sud Kivu, 25 November 2013.
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the secteur, at which representatives are elected. However, this is politically sensitive issue. 
Efforts in the past to acknowledge Kitchange as a town were seen as promoting the land 
governing authority of one ethnic community. 
We noted striking differences among organizations in their expectations about the 
possibilities to re-legitimize the Congolese state. In the experience of some representatives, 
even if state institutions fail to serve their citizens in many respects, local people ask for 
formal authorities, and the notion that some form of ‘state’ is needed is widely shared. 
This is exemplified by the fact that, for instance, there is a lot of respect for elected 
representatives, or by the ways in which non-state actors copy state-like structures, like Koen 
Vlassenroot has argued for rebel groups in the Kivus.
25
 However, the ‘idea of the state’ as 
a desirable overarching structure, stands in stark contrast to the idea of the actual state, 
which, as many interviewees expressed, has lost any legitimacy. Some organisations hold 
that the Congolese state is beyond redemption. “All authorities, the land administration, the 
customary chiefs, the state, they are seen as oppressors, levying taxes and doing nothing”, 
one interviewee remarked, “and even if there is political will, how can citizens trust state 
justice system if staff of the tribunals do not receive salaries?”
26
 Other organisations simply 
consider not having a role in good governance and state-citizen relations.
Finally, several interviewees stressed the need to strengthen civil society. Civil society has 
important roles to play in representing the population and proposing changes in legislation 
or suggestions for policy. Interviewees pointed out that civil society in the Kivus has limited 
visibility and influence at the political level. They state that civil society was weakened with 
the 2006 elections when key representatives from civil society moved to parliament and their 
organisations remained beheaded. Regaining political leverage is a slow process. Moreover, 
civil society is divided politically and ethnically, and more focussed on humanitarian services 
provision than on voicing alternative political standpoints. As one Congolese interviewee 
observed: “their recommendations regarding the Reforme Foncière are very general”.
27
 
A problem here is also that a real common platform for exchange within civil society 
is lacking. In some provinces, the provincial authorities provide space for civil society 
representation (for instance in the form of the Sous Coordination Foncier at provincial level). 
In other provinces, however, civil society representation at provincial level is orchestrated 
from above. UN-Habitat is currently making efforts to bring Civil Society together. There is 
some level of collaboration in the provincial Groupe Sectorielle on land. Even so, the question 
poses itself to what extent strategies for institution building should give more attention to 
the development of a platform for civil society.
25 Presentation at the ‘‘World Conference on Humanitarian Studies’’ Istanbul, 24-27 October 2013. See also: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=GmoqtST2pkA
26 Christian Kambaza, Faustin Kamwendo, Serge Sangala, ICLA, 20 November 2013.
27 Loochi Muzaliwa, LPI, 26 November 2013.
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Conclusion
This research explored how land governance interventions – centred on land conflicts and 
securing land tenure – tie in with broader processes of institution building and state building 
in the Kivu Provinces. From the interviews it is clear that interveners recognised the potential 
of interventions on land tenure to contribute to more effective and legitimate forms of 
public authority and, eventually, state building. So far, however, such aspects do not feature 
centrally in intervention programmes. Land governance, at the moment, is not a well laid-out 
‘avenue’ for state building – as we suggest in the title-, though some footpaths have already 
emerged and have the potential to grow into more transited roads. In this concluding section 
we argue for a more systematic reflection on, and tracing of, the effects of land governance 
interventions on public authority and state building. If the ambition is to contribute to local 
state building, what are the implications of our findings for future interventions in land 
governance? And what are the challenges that need to be addressed?
We structure our review of the main ways in which land governance may feed into state 
building around the three main dimensions of state building as suggested by the OECD-DAC 
(2008). This is followed by a review of the main challenges we identified.
Land governance programmes and state building in eastern DRC
State Capacity
We identified a strong focus on strengthening institutional capacity at the local level, with 
some room, in some programmes, for explicitly strengthening local state authorities. 
Overall, the concern was with creating or strengthening effective institutions, rather than 
with strengthening the state per se. In some cases, customary authorities (chiefs) were 
supported, in other cases the emphasis was on creating effective community-level bodies 
for representation and organisation (committees). In these interventions, capacity was 
targeted through: clarification or affirmation of roles (of customary authorities vis-à-vis the 
state); knowledge-building (e.g. on relevant legislation); and introducing good governance 
measures. Given the limited confidence in and expectations of the state, the concern with 
governance in practice often implied a focus on institution building at the local level more in 
general, rather than on local state building. Yet, there was some focus on strengthening state 
capacity at provincial and national level. We argue that more explicit consideration needs 
to be given to the effects of these investments in local level institutional capacity for state 
authority, and the potential risks of missing opportunities to support the re-emerging state. 
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State legitimacy
As regards the legitimacy of state institutions at the local level, we found that interventions 
linked legitimacy to the issue of capacity: affirmation/clarification of roles, knowledge-
building and the introduction of good governance principles were introduced to solve 
both capacity problems and legitimacy problems. Accountability, transparency and broad 
representation were proposed with a view to durable solutions to land conflicts and tenure 
insecurity but also as a way to enhance the legitimacy of those authorities implementing 
these solutions. We argue that more explicit consideration needs to be given to the question 
how performance feeds into legitimacy and how efforts influence the relative legitimacies of 
state and non-state authorities (customary or newly created bodies). 
As regards the legitimacy of state legislation, we found that overall, programmes tended 
to affirm state legislation vis-à-vis local arrangements, though there was some attention 
for recognition of local property arrangements. We argue that more reflection is needed on 
the implications of this bias in favour of state legislation and the way it might interact (and 
potentially undermine/delegitimize) local property arrangements. 
State-society relations
The creation of local committees as a means to introduce more inclusive forms of 
representation around land governance may create broader or better spaces for dialogue 
at the local level. So far, it is unclear to what extent these spaces will work towards better 
dialogue with the state. When state authorities become more strongly affirmed at the 
local level, the committees may provide an interesting and effective interface to settle land 
governance issues. Similarly, these committees might, eventually, act as bodies representing 
local concerns to higher level state authorities. At the provincial and sometimes national 
levels the interventions we reviewed worked to enlarge the space for dialogue between state 
and society through the creation of platforms or enhancing the participation of state officials 
in provincial, national and even international discussions. We encourage a more explicit 
focus on spaces for dialogue in which relations between local public authority and citizens 
can be renegotiated. This implies acting on the process of institutional change rather than 
focussing only on its intended outcomes. 
Challenges and implications 
The strategies we describe in this report are still relatively new and it is still early to gauge 
their impact. It would need careful tracing, in the coming years, what the investments 
in local level institutional capacity mean for state authority, for the relative legitimacies 
of different institutions, and for the eventual implications for governance in practice. 
The participation of customary authorities in the emerging dispute resolution structures 
enabled local people to criticize their actions and so demand for accountability. Yet, to what 
extent this indeed results in changes of behaviour and more local legitimacy remains to be 
explored. We found limited discussion on the unpredictable and possibly adverse effects of 
interventions on local governance processes. A point of concern is the proliferation of newly 
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established institutions (committees), and the risk that they might actually undermine the 
re-establishment of the state, or add to competition between different institutions. It remains 
to be explored whether community-level committees created by NGOs become platforms 
that effectively facilitate local reflection and strategizing on land-related challenges. Another 
question is about the impact of training on state legislation and the emphasis on women’s 
rights in trainings: does it lead to greater acceptance of women’s rights to land or, in contrast 
– as some evidence suggests – , does it lead to resistance even amongst women?
We argue that, if the impact of land governance programs on state building processes is to 
be maximized – a goal which organisations might embrace to varying degrees-, this would 
require more systematic reflection on, and tracing of, the effects of interventions in land 
governance on public authority and the role of the state. More concretely we suggest that:
 h Interveners should continue to explore strategic linkages between land 
governance, institutional strengthening and state building, and whether 
and how this could feature more centrally in intervention programmes.  
 h In these efforts, more specific attention should be given to how to 
contribute to local state building, rather than institutional strengthening 
per se.  
 h Considering that the linkages between those issues are not yet fully 
understood, interveners should carefully record the impact of their 
interventions on different local institutions and their relations, as 
regards their relative authority and legitimacy, and monitor the 
governance, outcomes of these changes.  
 h More extensive fieldwork would be required to assess the actual 
(intended and unintended) impacts of land governance-related 
interventions on institutional strengthening and state building, and on 
how specific contradictions might be solved.
In our view, a more effective engagement with state building would need to address the 
following core issues:
To what extent and in what ways can customary authorities serve as anchor points for 
legitimate and authoritative land governance? We noted already that there is a certain 
controversy around the role of customary chiefs. For instance, in our restitution workshop, 
participants strongly differed on the proposition “The authority of customary chiefs is too 
damaged to serve as a building block for effective land governance”.
28
Some interveners see 
them as too damaged to serve as a building block for effective land governance, whereas 
others are more optimistic, but point out that strengthening them requires better identifying 
28 “L’autorité des chefs coutumiers est trop fragilisée pour en y construire une gouvernance foncière effective”, Atelier de restitution, Goma, 29 
November 2013.
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what their roles should look like: should they have substantial administrative responsibility 
or rather get a symbolic function? How to deal with their tendencies of seeing themselves 
as sovereign powers, their past involvement in manipulation of land ownership, and – in 
some localities – their loss of legitimacy? Or as one interviewee put it, “How to arrive at 
strong institutions, rather than at strong men?”29 How to improve checks and balances 
and strengthen the position of the conseils de chefferie vis-a-vis the chef coutumier? And 
more in general: if the role of customary authorities is reduced, should this imply also the 
end of more customary forms of land governance? Can individualising land access be a 
viable alternative, or will that harm tenure insecurity of customary right holders? And what 
will this imply for the ongoing decentralization process? For instance, to what extent may 
empowerment of local land management increase customary tenure security? 
To what extent and in what ways could local conventions, norms and practices serve as a 
solution for land problems experienced at the local level, and what is needed to protect and 
promote those? The interviews suggested that in many local settings local norms, rules and 
conventions still have considerable legitimacy, and play a role in protecting certain land-
insecure groups like widows and orphans or settling land disputes involving returnees. Even 
if particular arrangements are weakened or criticized, land governance might build on this 
local potential for consensual arrangements. There is a risk that interventions to strengthen 
local conventions rather contribute to their erosion. Codification, for instance, may change 
the flexible and adaptive character of such conventions. Above, we noticed the paradox 
of recognizing local arrangements, but at the same time trying to conform them to state 
legislation. This might undo local conventions, norms and practices of their unique, context-
specific, attributes. 
Do locally experienced land problems require intervention, like legislative reform, at higher 
levels? We argue that there is a need to re-consider how perspectives, best practices, and 
solutions from the local level can be taken up more effectively in policy making at higher 
levels, or at the least be acknowledged as legitimate. At the same time, while inclusive local 
dialogue and decision taking may be the solution to some problems, there remains an 
important role for strategic policy decisions at the national level. 
Underlying those questions is the fundamental question: What type of state is imagined for 
DRC? In most of the programmes reviewed, ideas about the imagined or desired nature of 
the state were not made explicit. What kind of state is achievable at the central, provincial 
and local state levels, considering current weaknesses of state services provision as well as 
(predatory) state practices regarding land? Is a state-centred model suitable to DRC or is, as 
the current programmes implicitly seem to head for, a ‘hybrid’ model more feasible, in which 
institutionality is built on customary and community-based as well as on state structures? 
But what kind of ‘hybrid’ model would work, what would it look like? And what is the leverage 
that external interveners can hope to have on shaping the character of the state in DRC? 
They can insist on its form perhaps, but cannot control its functioning. Rules may be set, 
for example to place limits on the amount of land to be given out in concessions, but these 
could be avoided in practice. 
29 Professeur Kennedy Bindu, 28 November 2013.
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 h Interveners in land governance should be more explicit about their 
assumptions, positions and ambitions in state building, particularly 
about the envisioned role of customary authorities and local 
arrangements in local land governance. If assumptions about the 
‘imagined’ state are put up for debate this would enhance reflection 
between domestic actors and interveners.
In formulating visions of what local land governance could look like, and what character the 
state could have, the involvement of common citizens is crucial. We observed that many 
organizations emphasise the need to promote active citizenship and train people to address 
their leaders. In the validation session we conducted at the end of fieldwork, the proposition 
“The central challenge for intervenors is to support the capacity of citizens to advance 
demands to their authorities”
30
received unanimous support. In this connection it was 
observed that more could be done to strengthen civil society alliances, and to assure that 
debate at this level fuels policy debate but also that outcomes are brought back to the local 
level. Some interviewees even observed that the main role of international interveners should 
be to facilitate the input of civil society in policy making.
At the same time, we noticed a contradiction around local ownership in land governance. 
While many organizations emphasise that solutions to specific land governance problems 
may be found at the local level and argue that the space for local arrangement should be 
strengthened, at the same time there is lingering distrust in such local solutions. We noticed 
that interveners were concerned about the eventual outcomes – for instance, whether 
local arrangements would conform to state legislation or human rights standards (e.g. 
gender equality). Interveners expressed a need not only to recognise and harness, but also to 
monitor and transform local arrangements. The question is to what extent such a legalist and 
transformative focus risks complicating rather than stimulating local processes of dialogue 
and discussion. For instance, too much concern with developing norms and rules that 
comply with national legislation might be at the expense of local legitimacy of procedures 
and norms. 
 h Congolese and international development organizations should 
facilitate societal debate regarding the role of customary authorities 
and community-level institutions in local land governance, and what 
type of state may be realistically built. A proposal for land governance 
in post-conflict settings, like that of Unruh (2003), suggests to follow 
an iterative process, gradually moving forward building on both local 
arrangements (traditional or emerged during the war) and state 
solutions. We see a distinct risk of local dispossession and weakening 
of protection if local arrangements are not recognised and, where 
necessary, harnessed. 
30 “Le défi principal pour les intervenants est de faciliter et appuyer la capacité des citoyens de promouvoir ses demandes chez leurs autorités”, 
Atelier de restitution, Goma, 29 November 2013.
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 h More effort should be put in strengthening the capacities of civil society 
organizations to enable their contribution to debates about key policy 
questions, and to facilitate their role of channelling the voices of local 
citizens. 
 h In this, interveners need to be careful to impose their own images 
of legitimate governance. They should be wary of applying legalist 
and transformative approaches regarding local land governance 
arrangements, and primarily be concerned about how local ownership 
and legitimacy of rules and norms may be guaranteed.
Various organizations observe that the policy debate on land governance reform is not 
informed enough by the realities of land problems on the ground. “We need legislation that 
is aware of local context and social organization, and the regional diversity in this”
31
 Among 
organizations there is awareness of regional differences, but knowledge is scattered and 
perspectives are divergent (e.g. on the pertinence of identity issues). While some claim that 
there is a lack of attention for land problems in towns, others consider there is too much 
emphasis on urban land problems. Some areas are in the focus of attention of interveners 
(Masisi, Kalehe) others seem overlooked (Fizi). In interviews, the need was emphasised for 
more research on regional diversity, with Congolese universities playing a larger role. Some 
interviewees also pointed to the need for perspectives from other disciplines (agronomy, 
economy, sociology) as the debate on land reform seems to be dominated by legal specialists.
Some interviewees pointed to the risks involved in building solutions too much on best 
practices from abroad and experiences from international partners. In this connection, 
the current emphasis on modernizing the documentation of titles needs to be mentioned. 
Some interveners and policy makers have high hopes that formal titling is the most effective 
strategy to increase tenure security and reduce land disputes. However, various Congolese 
organisations pointed out that official titles often have limited legitimacy, while the experience 
from other countries shows that uncritical promotion of titling is risky and might even 
damage existing mechanisms for securing tenure (see e.g. Musembi 2007; Sjaastad & 
Cousins 2008). There is a need to explore into more detail what tenure security is about in 
different locations and how this can be strengthened, looking beyond the issue of titling. 
Some interviewees pointed out that international expertise should rather focus on helping 
identifying the questions and pointing out critical questions – like: how to fit land law into 
decentralization? – rather than in providing solutions. Rather than taking charge, international 
interveners might best try to practice humility and facilitate processes of exploration of 
alternative solutions. 
31 Severin Mugangu Matabano, 26 November 2013. 
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 h More extensive fieldwork should be done to assess how diverse 
strategies for land governance reform work out and contribute to 
securing tenure and more effective resolution of land disputes. In this, it 
is important to take account of the substantial diversity in local realities 
on the ground.
Finally, it should be noticed that the Congolese government itself displays an interest 
in strengthening the state at the local level. Though implementation of policies for 
decentralization is erratic, it should be noticed that – notably at the provincial level- efforts 
are being made, including the convening of land commissions, the organization of land 
dispute resolution councils in the territories, and the installation of decentralized juridical 
and land administrative services. These efforts may serve the goal of improving service 
provision, or of increasing state presence at the local level. The question then is: what kind of 
state? Within the framework of this research it was not possible to explore in any depth how 
the Congolese government itself looks at state building or the opportunities provided by land 
governance interventions to feed into state-building, This is certainly a question that deserves 
more research. 
This study registered a limited confidence in the state’s ability to improve land governance. 
At the same time, interviewees mentioned a range of examples of state representatives who 
try to foster stability in their areas and make substantial contributions to more effective land 
governance. It was emphasised that political elites are heterogeneous and that there are also 
upcoming new elites with a stronger sense of public responsibility. This motivates our final 
recommendation:
 h Interveners should put more effort in identifying key actors in the state 
apparatus with the political will to improve land governance in DRC, 
both at the local and the national level.
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People interviewed
19 November
•	 Tobias Petrelius, Life & Peace Institute (LPI).
•	 Vyosivyase Caviste, Chef d’Antenne, & Erick Murairi, Forum des Amis de la Terre (FAT).
•	 Eddy Byamungu, Chargé Programme, Aide et Action pour la Paix (AAP).
20 November
•	 Chantalle Kambibi, STAREC.
•	 Gaëlle Cornuz, Stabilization Officer, MONUSCO.
•	 Francesco Mascini, Premier Secrétaire. Ambassade du Royaume des Pays-Bas.
•	 Christian Kambaza, Coordinateur; Faustin Kamwendo, Coordinateur Programmes; Serge 
Sangala, Conseilleur Juridique, NRC-ICLA.
•	 Honore Banyene, UN-Habitat Goma.
21 November
•	 Representants du Sous Coordination Foncière de Masisi.
•	 Tussi Alexis, Chef coutumier, administrateur collectivité de Osso Banyungu.
22 November
•	 Administrateur de Territoire de Masisi.
•	 Martin Luther I Lentuni, President du Tribunal de la Paix, Masisi.
•	 Mwami Biizi Ngulu, Delon Muisha, représentante du CLPC Masisi.
•	 Christol Paluku Mastaki, Chef de Projet, Rights and Resources.
24 November
•	 Déogratias Buuma Namira, Secrétaire Exécutif, Action pour la Paix et la Concorde (APC).
25 November
•	 George Bwema, Senior Programme Officer, NRC-ICLA Sud Kivu.
•	 Jean-Baptiste Safari Bagula, Coordinateur, Innovation & Formation pour le 
Développement et la Paix (IFDP).
•	 Tharcisse Kayera, ADEPAE.
•	 Déogratias Bashibirhana, Chargé Programme Foncière, Coopération Suisse.
•	 Jean-Jacques Nganya, Pax Christi Uvira.
•	 Innocent Utshudi Ona, Université Catholique de Bukavu.
26 November
•	 Frank Reziki, Charles Mukamba, Jean Paul Tiarazire, Christien Mwanza, Télésphore 
Mwanza, Gérard Kwywaza, Héritiers de la Justice.
•	 Prof. Severin Mugangu Matabaro, Directeur de Cabinet du Gouverneur de Province Sud-
Kivu.
•	 Loochi Muzaliwa, Coordinateur de Programme Institut Vie et Paix (LPI).
•	 Emmanuel Ziulu, Coordinateur, Fédération des Organisations de Producteurs Agricoles 
du Congo (FOPAC).
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27 November
•	 Maria Lange, Directrice Nationale, International Alert.
•	 Pasteur Kitunda Senforien et collegues, Baraza Intercommunautaire.
28 November
•	 Pierre Gusira, Chargé de Programme PNUD BT-Goma.
•	 Prof. Dr Kennedy Kihangi Bindu, Université Libre des Pays des Grands Lacs, ULPGL/
Goma. Oumar Sylla, UN-Habitat.
29 November
•	 Restitution workshop in Goma, in which about 30 people participated.
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